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10 YEARS AFTER 9/11: AND STILL FIGHTING NEW
WARS WITH OLD WEAPONS
Why and how the Geneva Conventions must
be Amended to Cover al Qaeda
Dominic Hoerauf*
I. Introduction
The saying “Without security, there is no freedom”1 by the state philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt is more topical today than ever. The 9/11 attacks manifested a change of menaces to our security, speaking with Humboldt, and hence to our fundamental freedoms and liberties. These threats,
posed by new asymmetric and denationalized warfare aimed at inducing a state of terror, present
new challenges for the defense of western democracies, specifically to state concepts based on the
consent of the governed (states of consent2). Although it has been ten years since 9/11, the United
States still has not managed to fully grasp the unique character of the “new wars” of the 21st century.3 Neither the United States nor other western governments have generated a consensus on the
general nature of the enemy we face.4 Yet, answering this question is a prerequisite for the determination of which weapons should be used in order to tackle this phenomenon. As a result, we still
try to fight these new wars with tried and trusted “old war” methods of 20th century nation-state wars
instead of adjusting our weaponry to the new nature of the enemies: denationalized terrorist networks such as al Qaeda.
Unsurprisingly, this incompatibility of our weapons and the nature of our enemies compromises
our contemporary warfare efforts and has essentially dragged the US into one of the longest con-

* Dominic Hoerauf is a Fulbright and Ambassadorial Scholar, and 2012 LL.M. candidate focusing on Human Rights
and the War on Terror at Columbia Law School. He holds a law degree and a Ph.D. from Humboldt University Berlin/
Germany.
1 See Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, Staates 51 The Sphere and Duties of Government 52 (Joseph Coulthoud,
trans., John Chapman 1854) (1792) (describing the necessity of state security in a democratic society).
2 Philip Bobbitt, Terror And Consent: The Wars For the Twenty-First Century 182 (2008).
3 See Mary Kaldor, New & old wars: Organized violence in a Global Era 169-170 (2d ed. 2007) (analyzing the
characteristics of “new war” methodology).
4 See Paul Bernan, Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium 23 (2005) (emphasizing the lack of clarity
surrounding the new enemy encompassed under the heading of “terrorism”).
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flicts ever.5 The tools currently at hand, which evolved primarily in the context of conflicts between
nation states, do not readily apply to a war on terror that is induced by transnational non-state actors.6
Not only challenge these shortcomings the effectiveness of military operations and their supporting
intelligence activities (warfare in a narrower sense); t hey also, and perhaps more importantly, deprive
our domestic as well as international legal tools7 of their legitimacy and of their effectiveness putting
at risk the cornerstones of our constitutional order.8
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which it had to determine whether
and to what extent the Geneva Conventions (“GC”) protected alleged al Qaeda captives,9 this incompatibility of tools and tasks became apparent. Although more than five years have passed,
neither the outgoing nor the incoming administration has demonstrated the political will to push
forward possible solutions to close this gap.10 Even though President Obama ordered in 2009 to
treat Guantanamo detainees in accordance with the Geneva Conventions11 (yet as a matter of policy
rather than as a matter of law), which after all is a positive step, the administration refused to address
or even acknowledge the pressing need to overhaul the laws of war.12 More recently, it was not only
this reluctance to introduce an initiative leading to the reform of the Geneva Conventions, but also
the administration’s deliberate leveraging of this gap by signing into law the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (“NDAA”) on December 31st, 2011.13 Section 1021 of this Act authorizes
indefinite military detention without any charge or trial, which, given that the military commissions
reintroduced by Subsection (c)(2) do not represent an adequate trial substitute,14 amounts to nothing
but a blatant breach of Common Article 3 GC.15
One might ask how that is to be reconciled with President Obama’s Executive Order 13,492
5 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770, 797-98 (2008) (noting that the current conflict “is already among the
longest wars in American history”).
6 In Re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, at 18, Misc. No. 08-442 (Mar.13, 2009), [hereinafter Respondent’s
Memorandum] USDC DCDC 08-442 (D.D.C filed Aug. 1, 2008) (No. 1689).
7 Eventually, law (and adherence to it) is what makes this system stable and strong; law is our ultimate weapon of
war. See Charles J. Dunlap, Prepared for the Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference, Law and
Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Nov. 29, 2001) (defining the
term “lawfare” as the “use of law as a weapon of war”).
8 See generally, Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 523-24.
9 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
10 See Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1, 6 (highlighting the. Obama administration’s acknowledgment that
the laws of war are “less well-codified with respect to our current, novel type of armed conflict against . . . al-Qaida” and
noting that “instead of proposing an amendment, the government only talks about how domestic provisions should be
interpreted in light of this dilemma).
11 See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 § 6 (January 22, 2009).
12 See Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1, 6.
13 National Defense Authorization Act of (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2012)
[hereinafter NDAA].
14 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 729.
15
See, e.g., Jessica Jewell, NDAA violates American Rights (Jan. 23, 2012)., Daily Sundial, http://sundial.csun.
edu/2012/01/ndaa-violates-american-rights/.
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of 2009, which demanded strict compliance with Common Article 3 GC?16 What is the underlying rationale of the administration’s decision not to veto this bill? And what was Congress’s motive
to come up with an act at least in the shadow of international law? Upon closer examination, the
Geneva Conventions themselves give a possible explanation. Since this framework was obviously
not designed to deal with transnational actors in the first place and thus to date does not provide
mechanisms tailored to the specific problems associated with a-national threats, its regulatory reach
is highly questionable with respect to al Qaeda.17 The result is an international legal grey area that
poses more questions than it answers. Whereas President Bush saw no reason to apply the Geneva
Conventions to al Qaeda fighters,18 the Supreme Court adopted a different position19 that the Obama
administration, at least at first, seemed to share.20 Given that Congress has just passed the NDAA,
it must be inferred that Congress by contrast holds another view.21 In light of the Charming Betsy
canon,22 Congress most likely considers the Geneva Conventions not to stand in the NDAA’s Section 1021’s way. President Obama for some reason apparently now has yielded to Congress’s pressure, given up his initial plan to veto the bill, and essentially endorsed Congress’ view by signing the
NDAA into law.23 He has taken advantage of the confusion already surrounding the relationship of
the Geneva Conventions and al Qaeda to avoid further domestic disputes, even though this effectively adds to the puzzlement already surrounding the relationship of the Geneva Conventions and
al Qaeda.24
Yet, as this piece argues, a better strategy might have been to push for an amendment of the Ge-

16 See supra note 11, § 3(a) (Subsection heading: “Common Article 3 Standards as a Minimum Baseline”).
17 See infra at III.B. (discussing the fractioned decisions in Hamdan and the effect of the splintered discourse).
18 John D. Rockefeller IV, Release of Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel’s Opinions on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program 13 (April 22, 2009).
19 See generally Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (holding that Guantanamo detainees are protected by the Geneva Conventions).
20 Supra note 11, § 6.
21 See, e.g., Marty Lederman and Steven Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws of War-Part II,
Lawfare Blog (Dec. 2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-laws-of-warpart-ii/ (overviewing the background and legislative history surrounding the NDAA).
22 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (holding that “an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains”); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619
F.3d 1, 32-36 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See generally, Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1103, 1135 (1990) (explaining the history of the Charming Betsy canon).
23 NDAA, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011); see Mark Lander, After Struggle on Detainees, Obama Signs Defense Bill, New York Times
(Dec 31, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/us/politics/obama-signs-military-spending-bill.html.
24 The European Parliament, for instance, has adopted a resolution (B5-0066/2002) stating that al Qaeda terrorists
“do not fall precisely within the definitions of the Geneva Conventions.” The Bush administration took a similar view
declaring that they “do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention.” Office of Asst. Sec’y of Def. News Transcript:
DoD News Briefing (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031. Contrary
to this, the Supreme Court held in Hamdan, that at least Common Article 3 of the Conventions applies. Hamdan, 548 U.S.
at 567.
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neva Conventions once and for all.25 For that is what coping with al Qaeda requires us to do: adapt
our hitherto applied categories to new realities, leave the dubious shadow of the law, and look for a
new international legal approach designed to deal with the nature of the new enemy26 without abandoning the cornerstones of our constitutional orders.27 Ultimately, the war on terror is nothing but
a war for the preservation of our constitutional values and the rule of law.28 That is why amending
the laws of war is the only way we can obtain results that both meet today’s challenges to national
security and at the same time leave our democratic, rule-of-law oriented heritage untouched.29 Indeed,
security and liberty are not irreconcilable at all—as some still assert30—but are in fact, as von Humboldt recognized, mutually depending on each other.31 Reconciling national security with the protection of basic rights is paramount and insofar predetermining the design of that new legal category
we should be looking for when revising the Geneva Conventions. After all, it is terror that we are
fighting and not simply the terrorists.32
In an attempt to show not only why but also how the old weapons need to be overhauled, Part I
of this piece first introduces the nation states’ international legal tools derived in the period of interand later also intra-nation state wars of the 20th century. Part II then analyzes how courts have tried
to apply these tools, most notably in Hamdan, and why this exercise was bound to fail. Part III demonstrates why sticking to those tools was and is still not an option for rule-of-law based democracies,
and why this in fact makes us all the more vulnerable to terrorism. Finally, Part IV suggests a solution that both adequately addresses the nature of the enemy and conforms with our constitutional
principles. This ought to clarify both the scope and content of the Geneva Conventions regarding
transnational actors with the goal of removing this grey area of the laws of war that allowed the
passage of NDAA’s Section 1021.

25 See, e.g., Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 532 (“Because current international law has not caught up with the changes in the
global strategic context, it seems to present states with an intolerable choice: either follow the rule of law and sacrifice one
war aim . . . or dispense with law and sacrifice the legitimacy of the war effort . . . . The answer to this dilemma is to reject
it; law must be reformed.”).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 541 (stating that “[w]e should not abandon the constitutional restraints on the executive that distinguish states
of consent”).
28 Id. at 152.
29 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror,
153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 675, 755, 761 (2004) (discussing “twin goals”). We pursue this second goal for our own sake, not for
the sake of the terrorists. Therefore, it is misguided to argue that al Qaeda members do not deserve due process since
they are fighting against those very values. See Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After September 11: History Revisited and
Law Revised, in New Wars, New Laws? Applying the Laws of war in 21st Century Conflicts 75, 117 (David Wippman
& Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).
30 Florida International University, At war with Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, A Constitutional Symposium
(2006).
31 Von Humboldt, supra note 1, at 51.
32 Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 391.
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II. The Nation States’ International Legal Tools for the Nation State
Wars’ Challenges
A. International Humanitarian Law—
Concept and History
Although wars have been fought throughout the existence of mankind, they repeatedly shake
our societies’ cornerstones—both from a humanitarian and legal standpoint.33 With this in mind,
and in order to mitigate human plight during wartime, a broad consensus has been reached on a
regime comprised of international treaties and customary international law stipulating rules for
extraordinary times of war (jus in bello).34 They recognize that no matter how exceptional a situation becomes, there can be no exception to certain human rights. That way, those laws of war try to
preserve core values even in times of war.35
The most prominent set of such rules is laid down in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Their
overarching goal is to protect the wounded, prisoners of war and civilians.36 To that end, they define
the status, rights, and duties of enemy nations and of enemy individuals with respect to wounded37
or captured soldiers38 as well as civilians39. Special attention should be given to “Common” Article
3. As a provision common to all four Conventions, Common Article 3 establishes non-derogable
rules prescribing (limited) due process guarantees for wartime detainees by requiring qualified procedures for sentencing captives in order to prevent arbitrary military detention.40 Common Article 3 is
different from the rest of the Conventions’ provisions in that it lacks any condition with respect to
reciprocity.41 Hence, each party has to observe its requisites even if its opponent does not abide to
them.

33 Marco Sassou & Antoine A. Bouvier et. al., How does Law Protect in War 84 (2d. ed. 2003) (citing Frederic
Maurice: “War anywhere is first and foremost an institutional disaster, the breakdown of legal systems, a circumstance
in which rights are secured by force. Everyone who has experienced war, particularly the wars of our times, knows that
unleashed violence means the obliteration of standards of behaviour and legal systems. Humanitarian action in a war
situation is therefore above all a legal approach which precedes and accompanies the actual provision of relief.”).
34 International Committee of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions, Preliminary Remarks 1-2, 5 (1949).
35 Sassou & Bouvier, supra note 33, at 342.
36 International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 34, at 2.
37 The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I] and the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II].
38 The Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter GC III].
39 The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
40 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law 60 (3d. ed. 2008).
41 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary: III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
35 (J. Pictet gen.ed. 1958) [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention Commentary].
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B. 1977: Responding to Altered Realities
Adopted in post-World War II, the Geneva Conventions were originally designed to regulate
conflicts between armed forces of nation states, in other words traditional inter-nation states wars.42
However, in the two decades following their adoption, more and more intra-nation states armed
liberation conflicts arose.43 As Common Article 3 provided only limited protection in these cases, an
additional protocol (AP) to the 1949 Conventions was adopted in 1977. Covering non-international
armed conflicts, it was exclusively devoted to clashes “which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces”, Article 1(1) AP II.44 Just
like in Common Article 3 and Article 102 GC III, passing valid sentences under AP II calls for a due
process minimum provided by courts offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.45
III. New wars, new Challenges—Why the
old Weapons no Longer Worked
A. Today’s Challenges for
the Geneva Conventions
Although the Conventions and its Additional Protocols have successfully governed several centuries of armed hostilities between and within nation states, transnational terrorist networks such as al
Qaeda have suddenly confronted the international regime with new challenges. As a globally acting
non-state actor, whose goals (to induce a state of terror)46 are fundamentally different from those
of traditional warfare, al Qaeda raises at least three important questions with regard to the Geneva
Conventions’ applicability: (1) whether the Geneva Conventions are after all applicable to the war
against al Qaeda, and if so, whether (2) whether detained al Qaeda fighters are entitled to Prisoner-ofWar status under Article 4A GC III or rather only to Common Article 3 guarantees, and; (3) if the
Conventions apply, whether the process provided by the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT)
is sufficient to fulfill their requirements?
B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, these questions were explored by a U.S. court for the first time.47 Hamdan, a citizen of Yemen, was captured in 2001 by Afghan militia forces and turned over to U.S.

42 In Re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, supra note 6, at 1.
43 International Committee of the Red Cross, Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in NonInternational Conflicts, Foreword (2008).
44 Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 Am. U. L Rev. 30-31 (1983).
45 Art. 6(2) AP II.
46 See Kaldor, supra note 3, at 9, 165, 167 (“[T]he main effect of these attacks is to increase the sense of insecurity . . . .”)
47 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006).
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military forces, which transported him to the Guantanamo Bay.48 Initially, he was held in the general
detention facility until 2003, when the President determined that there was reason to believe that
Hamdan was a member of al Qaeda or otherwise involved in terrorism directed against the U.S..49
Due to this finding, Hamdan was placed in solitary confinement as an enemy combatant.50 In
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,51 Hamdan received a formal hearing
before a CSRT that affirmed his status as an enemy combatant and authorizing his further detainment.52 In 2004, Hamdan petitioned for habeas relief asserting, inter alia, that being tried solely by
military commission violated his individual rights as a Prisoner of War protected by Article 102 (in
conjunction with Article 4) GC III or, if he was not entitled to Prisoner-of-War (“POW”) status, his
rights set forth in Common Article 3.53
1. Al Qaeda and the applicability of the Geneva Convention
The District Court of the District of Columbia held that, contrary to what the government
believed, the Geneva Conventions applied to al Qaeda fighters just as they applied to the Taleban.54
Despite what the President claimed,55 the war against the Taleban was in no way distinguishable from
the war against al Qaeda.56 And since the Taleban was at that time governing Afghanistan, a party
to the Conventions, the conflict between the U.S. and Afghanistan constituted war of international
character and the Geneva Conventions covered Taleban as well as al Qaeda captives.57
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”),
however, took a different view and denied the applicability of the Conventions.58 It concluded that
the Geneva Conventions contemplated only two types of armed conflicts (an international conflict
and a civil war confined to a single country), neither of which resembled the one at issue.59 Since an
international conflict requires hostilities between two or more High Contracting Parties, and al Qaeda
as a non-state actor is neither a state nor a High Contracting party, the court held that the war in
48 Id. at 557; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
49 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572.
50 Id.
51 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
52 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 36.
53 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 156, 159 (D.D.C. 2004).
54 Id. at 161.
55 Memorandum from the President, to the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
(February 7, 2002), available at http://www.library.law.pace.edu/research/020207 bushmemo.pdf.
56 Id. (citing Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 Am.J. Int’l. L. 345,
349 (2002)) (referring to the common understanding).
57 Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 160-161; see also David Wippman, Introduction: Do New Wars Call for New Laws? in New
Wars, New Laws? Applying the Laws of war in 21st Century Conflicts 1, 6 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista
eds., 2005).
58 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 41-42 (deferring to the President’s judgment). Two Judges held that the Conventions did not in
any event apply to Hamdan. Id. at 40–42.
59 Id.
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question could not be categorized as an international conflict.60 Simultaneously, however, it was not
a “conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”61 as the war against al Qaeda was a global one.62 Yet, this ruling was overturned by the
Supreme Court.63 According to its interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, there was nothing to
bar its application to alleged al Qaeda captives.64
2. Level of protections for al Qaeda captives?
Having affirmed the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda detainees, the District
Court as well as the Supreme Court were forced to decide which provisions to apply;65 should the
captives be entitled to POW status and thus enjoy the full range of privileges the third Convention
entails?66 This, however, required the captives to meet the test established by Article 4A(2) GC III:
to wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, not to carry arms openly and to operate
under the laws and customs of war.67
Although it is questionable whether al Qaeda fighters fulfill those criteria,68 the District Court did
not rule on that issue.69 Instead, it relied on Article 5 GC III to hold that when in doubt about the
POW status of a captive70 a prisoner shall enjoy the POW protections until determined otherwise by
a competent tribunal. And since the District Court considered the CSRT to not be such a competent tribunal, it held that Hamdan was entitled to POW status.71 By contrast, the Supreme Court’s
decision is silent on the question whether Hamdan is entitled to POW status.72 Therefore, neither
the District Court not Supreme Court fully resolved whether al Qaeda captives are covered by Article
4A GC III.73
But what did the courts say about Common Article 3? Do at least those “elementary consider60 Id.
61 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 41 (emphasis added).
62 Id..
63 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
64 Id. at 562.
65 The Supreme Court chose Common Article 3, id., at 562 (holding that “[t]he Court need not decide the merits of
this argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions [referring to Common Article 3] that
applies here) whereas the District Court applied Article 4 GC III, see 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that
“Hamdan has, and must be accorded, the full protections of a prisoner-of-war” under Article 4 GC III until a competent
tribunal decides otherwise)
66 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 161-162 (D.D.C. 2004).
67 See Article 4A(2) GC III.
68 Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After September 11: History Revisited and Law Revised, in New Wars, New Laws?
Applying the Laws of war in 21st Century Conflicts 75, 84 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); see also
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
69 Id.
70 And in this case the Army’s regulations 190-8 provide that Hamdan’s status was in doubt due to his assertion of his
entitlement of POW status.
71 Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 173.
72 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 n.61 (2006).
73 Id.; Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 173.
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ations of humanity”74 apply to detained al Qaeda operatives? Contrary to what the U.S. government
asserted, the District Court held that Article 3 does not only cover domestic conflicts.75 Rather,
referring to the context in which it was adopted and to statements of the ICJ, it concluded that the
U.S. must abide by Common Article 3, regardless of whether the conflict is international or noninternational.76 The D.C. Circuit took the opposite position, applying Common Article 3 exclusively
to conflicts of non-international character “confined to a single country”.77 Though it refused to
second-guess the President’s judgment that the war against al Qaeda is a conflict distinct from the
inter-nation state conflict with the Taleban, it confirmed that the former was clearly international in
scope and thus would not fit the Common Article 3 definition.78
The Supreme Court, however, considered this reasoning to be erroneous.79 The phrase “not
of an international character” was only used as a contradistinction to a conflict between nations.80
Common Article 3 thus covers all kinds of clashes between a signatory and a non-state non-signatory
in the territory of a signatory,81 hence the war against al Qaeda, too. Since at least Common Article 3
applies, the Supreme Court refused to decide the questions of whether the war against the al Qaeda
is distinct from the war with convention signatory Afghanistan, and whether—as a consequence—
Hamdan is a prisoner of war.82
3. Do CSRT procedures satisfy Common Article 3?
With respect to whether the CSRT hearings provided the level of procedural protection required by Common Article 3, the District Court did not adopt a clear position.83 It concluded that
the CSRT did raise due process concerns, insofar as the defendant could be excluded from his trial
in order to protect classified evidence and that evidence may be used which the defendant never
gets to see.84 However, the Court refused to decide whether the CSRT met the standards Common
Article 3 prescribes.85
74 Nicaragua v. United States, I.C.J. 14, 114 (1986).
75 Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 162-163.
76 Id.
77 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 41-42.
78 Id. at 42.
79 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 562 (“The Court need not debate the merits of that argument here because there is at least one provision . . .
that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not between signatories.”).
83 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 166 (2004). It only held that the CSRT was not a competent tribunal as prescribed under Article
5 GC III, id. at 173.
84 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp.2d 152, 166 (D.D.C. 2004).
85 The District Court only found that the CSRT was not a competent tribunal to determine Hamdan’s status under the
Geneva Conventions, see 344 F. Supp.2d 152, 162 ( “There is nothing in this record to suggest that a competent tribunal
has determined that Hamdan is not a prisoner-of-war under the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan has appeared before
the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, but the CSRT was not established to address detainees’ status under the Geneva
Conventions.”).
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By contrast, the Supreme Court made its views on that issue known.86 In its opinion, the
military commission not only lacked jurisdiction,87 it also failed to respect the essential guarantees
required by Common Article 3.88 Although Common Article 3 does not define “all the judicial guarantees . . . recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples . . . it must be understood to incorporate
at least the barest of the trial protections recognized by customary international law.”89 Denying a
detainee the opportunity to be present during the course of his own trial and denying his ability to
see all evidence introduced against him indisputably violates customary international law both in
structure and procedure. Thus, the CSRTs fall short of the standard practices of customary international law established by Common Article 3.90
C. Open Questions
Despite this clear statement regarding the CSRTs shortcomings and its lack of jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court unfortunately did not answer all the questions presented by this case in a fully persuasive manner.
First, it is unclear why the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of whether Article 4
applies. Though the Court concluded that Common Article 3 applies,91 such does not exempt the
Court from reviewing the applicability of Article 4 GC III. Lower courts have disagreed on which
provision to apply.92 Besides, due to the different levels of protection, it does make a difference
whether Hamdan is entitled to POW status (or only to the “minimum” guarantees of Common
Article 3).93 Even though it is hard to believe that Hamdan could make a case insofar (owed to his
affiliation with al Qaeda rather than with the Taleban), the Supreme Court should have addressed that
issue.
Second, despite the fact that the Supreme Court held that alleged al Qaeda captives were pro86 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 560 (holding that “[t]he military commission at issue lacks the power to proceed because its
structure and procedures violate . . . the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949”).
87 Id. at 563-64 (due to the absence of an offense against the laws of war committed in the theater of war).
88 Id. at 564 (stating that “[t]he procedures adopted to try Hamdan deviate from those governing courts-martial in ways
not justified by practical need, and thus fail to afford the requisite guarantees”).
89 Id. at 564.
90 Id.
91 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 562 (holding that “[t]he Court need not decide the merits of this argument [whether the conflict
against al Qaeda constituted a different conflict from the one against the Taleban and therefore whether Hamdan was
entitled to POW status under Article 4 GC III] because there is at least one provision [Common Article 3] of the Geneva
Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not between signatories.”).
92 Compare the District Court’s holding (344 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 applying Article 4 GC III) with the D.C. Circuit’s
holding (415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) (finding that “One problem for Hamdan is that he does not fit the Article 4
definition of a ‘prisoner of war’ entitled to the protection of the Convention. He does not purport to be a member of a
group who displayed ‘a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance’ and who conducted ‘their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.’”).
93 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629-30 (discussing the distinction between Convention protections for a detainee captured
pursuant to the war against the Taliban and one captured in the war against al Qaeda).
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tected by Common Article 3,94 it failed to provide persuasive reasoning why. While the conventions
should be broadly interpreted in accordance with its object and purpose,95 One cannot ignore the
fact that neither the language of Common Article 3 nor its history supports the Supreme Court’s
interpretation. As the Supreme Court points out, the goal of Common Article 3 was “to furnish
minimal protection to rebels involved in one kind of ‘conflict not of an international character,’ i.e.,
a civil war..”96 Therefore, the term “conflict of non-international character” must be understood to
cover domestic conflicts only.97 This interpretation is supported by the plain language of Common
Article 3, which states that according to which it is to apply exclusively to non-international conflicts “occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”98 This clearly limits the very
“general” and “vague” scope of the expression “conflict not of an international character”99 and
ties Article 3 to domestic hostilities.100 Concededly, the Supreme Court is right in saying that “further
limiting language that would have rendered Article 3 applicable especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion” was omitted from the final version,101 suggesting a broad scope
of application so as to include transnational hostilities.102 Nevertheless, one cannot ignore that the
parties also refrained from removing the narrowing criteria “occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties,” which, if Common Article 3 was not intended to be limited to domestic
conflicts, was not necessary.103
Article 3’s limitation to domestic conflicts can also be inferred from the examples provided in
the Commentary on the Geneva Conventions.104 In providing examples to be covered under Article
3, the Commentary exclusively describes situations where insurgents or rebellions fight a de jure
government inside the government’s territory.105 Taking a closer look at the drafting history and the
motives for Common Article 3 further supports this conclusion: first the “[p]arty in revolt” needed
“an authority responsible for its acts . . . [and must be] acting within a determinate territory [with]
the means of respecting . . . the Convention”106 Another requirement set forth in the Commentary
was “[t]hat the insurgent civil authority exercise de facto authority over persons within a determinate

94 See id. at 562 (“Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection . . . to individual associated with
neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory who are involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of ’ a signatory.”).
95 See id. at 631 (citing the Third Geneva Convention Commentary 36-37).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary: III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
28 (emphasis added).
99 Third Geneva Convention Commentary, at 35.
100 Wippman, supra note 57, at 5.
101 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.
102 Id.
103 GC III, supra note 38, at art. 3.
104 Third Geneva Convention Commentary, at 36.
105 Id. at 35.
106 Id. at 36.
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portion of the national territory”.107 Absent a traditional command hierarchy, al Qaeda fulfills neither
of the criteria appearing to be tailored to domestic insurgent groups.108 The reasons for drafting
Common Article 3 further underline this finding. The Commentary reads: “. . . “the Red Cross has
long been trying to aid the victims of civil wars and internal conflicts, the dangers of which are sometimes even greater than those of international wars.”109 This emphasis on domestic conflicts clearly
indicates that the Red Cross, the architect of the Geneva Conventions, intended the terminus technicus
“conflict not of an international character” to be interpreted as hostilities taking place within one
country only.
Based on those criteria, the war against al Qaeda, taking place not only in the U.S. but also in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, can hardly be categorized as a Common Article 3 conflict for it
is not confined to one country.110 However, as this is exactly what Common Article 3 requires, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan is, from a purely legal standpoint, arguably questionable.111
D. Interim Finding
These deliberations reveal unsatisfying regulatory gaps between tried and trusted frameworks
and new realities, all of which raise crucial questions about whether the Geneva Conventions are in
fact still suited to cope with this new kind of war.112 As this analysis concludes: they are not. Even
the Supreme Court’s attempt to use nation states’ weapons for transnational threats is, as demonstrated, far from being convincing.113 That is not to say, however, that al Qaeda fighters should not
be treated in accordance with Common Article 3. Policy-wise and through the lens of the state of
consent, the Supreme Court has made the right decision. But given the nature of Common Article
3, under the separation of powers doctrine this was not its call to make.114 The 1949 Geneva Conventions, as of today, simply do not apply to transnational terrorist groups.115
107 Executive Power – Military Commissions – D.C. Circuit Upholds the Constitutionality of Military Commissions for Guantanamo
Bay Detainees – Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1606, 1612 (2006).
108 See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention Commentary 28 (discussing “a certain number of conditions on which the
application of the Convention would depend”).
109 Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
110 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address from the White House (Sept. 6, 2006) (announcing a global war on
terror: “To win the war on terror, we must be able to detain . . . terrorists captured here in American and on the battlefields
around the world”) (emphasis added).
111 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see also GC III, supra note 41, at art. 3.
112 See Newton, supra note 29, at 84 (“September 11 did serve to highlight a gap in the law between lawful combatants,
who are governed by clear legal norms, and innocent civilians, whom international law seeks to protect to the maximum
degree feasible from the effects of armed conflict.”).
113 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557.
114 As Charles-Louis Montesquieu-Louis Montesquieu, De l’esprit de loi, L.XI, chapter VI (1748), put it, the
Judiciary is just the mouth of the law, not its creator (“les juges de la nation ne sont . . . que la bouche, qui prononce les
paroles de la loi.”). De L’Esprit Des Lois, 149 (1748). It thus has no competence to deliver judgments outside the law.
115 Newton, supra note 29, at 84 (“As private terrorists waging war against the sovereign states of the world, al Qaeda
members do not meet the criteria in the Third Geneva Convention for status as prisoners of war. At the same time, they
do not qualify for the protections accorded innocent civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention.”).
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IV. Why new Constitutional Orders call
for new Legal Tools
So what, if anything, needs to be done? We need to craft new weapons for new wars. Instead
of operating outside the law and watching the Judiciary struggle to apply outdated weapons to new
wars’ challenges, the Executive and the Senate should consider refining the laws of war and amending the Conventions to cover al Qaeda captives. This is particularly necessary since conflicts involving transnational actors are only incompletely governed by customary international law.116 Congress,
together with the Executive must therefore construct new legal tools required by challenges posed
by the current conflict.117
And even in the meantime, the U.S. is well-advised to refrain from authorizations such as the
Sec. 1021 NDAA and to return—as it first did under President Obama—to the practice of previous
administrations that applied Article 3 as a matter of policy.118 This is what our rule-of-law heritage
requires us to do. This is what our constitutional order as states of consent require us to do, and
this is what distinguishes us from the terrorists.119 Our system, guided by the rule of law, provides
individuals whose rights are infringed upon by the state with some kind of due process.120 And
“due process does not perish when war comes”.121 In fact, preserving the state of consent against
forces advocating a fundamental departure from the mechanisms that ensure our current ordre public
essentially means upholding the former’s cornerstones: our democratic and rule-of-law-influenced
moral and ethical principles. Holding on to those principles is therefore especially crucial in rough
times.122 In order to achieve that, “our means must be guided by our ends”.123 As consequentialist
Machiavelli might have put it: Do not compromise our values! For abandoning our values is equivalent to giving up the state of consent,124 yielding to terror, and giving in to terrorism. In the end, we
are rather fighting terror (the terrorists’ aim, which is the collapse of our constitutional order), as
mentioned earlier, than we are fighting terrorists (actors).125 Terror is achieved either when people
116 Wippman, supra note 28, at 6 (“First, some academics and human rights activists . . . have expressed concern that
recent trends have exposed inadequacies in the protection afforded civilians.”).
117 See id. at 6 (“ . . . human rights activists view with alarm U.S. tactics in the fight against terrorism, and some seek
modifications to the law that would constrain possible excesses in that fight.”).
118 Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 463.
119 Id. at 541.
120 See U.S. Const. amend. V.
121 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
122 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 2648 (2004) (holding that “[i]t is during our most challenging and uncertain
moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must
preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad”). Even “[i]n new wars, all sides violate
the laws of war and human rights law. [Yet] the[t]he task of legitimate security forces is to . . . act in support of the rule
of law.” Kaldor, supra note 3, at 174.
123 Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 531.
124 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense,
we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”).
125 Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 391.
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are “dissuaded from doing what they have a lawful right to do”126 (positive element) or when they
or their institutions both intentionally and systematically breach their most fundamental obligations
(negative element), which are essential to our system of social compact. Primarily the latter is at
stake here. To put it differently, coping with al Qaeda has tempted the Bush administration to ignore
the very fundamental obligation to stay true to our rule-of-law heritage. As Bobbitt observed, “[w]hat
is threatened is threatened by our own actions when we are persuaded that compromises with our
constitutional traditions of consent are necessary to protect us.”127 We should not let this happen, as
this means that have not only lost a battle against the terrorists, but the whole war.
V. How the Conventions
Should Be Amended
With that being said, the goal that the revised Geneva Conventions need to pursue is sketched
out: a return to the rule of law by amending the Geneva Conventions in a way to cover al Qaeda. Instead of squeezing this new phenomenon into existing boxes, the High Contracting Parties
should create a new one, a third box of conflict categories: a transnational one128 in addition to
the international and domestic categories.129 They should adapt the framework to altered realities
and stop adding to the already existing confusion surrounding the reach of the Conventions with
respect to al Qaeda, confusion caused by the incompatibility of tools and tasks.130 This Third-box
approach should be preferred over Ehrenreich’s suggestion to abolish all categories of conflict from
the conventions,131 as the latter could not adequately satisfy needs for different protection levels in
different kind of conflicts.
Such provisions on transnational conflicts need to stipulate rules that are tailored to the special
character of transnational actors like terrorists and at the same time be consistent with state of consent’s foundations. The latter requires us to acknowledge that wars have changed: wars no longer
have a clear-cut beginning and end,132 there is no precisely definable battlefield, enemy association
(the central concept of the Geneva Conventions133) is no longer evident, the dividing lines between
civilians and soldiers have been blurred (inasmuch as has the distinction between internal and external conflicts134), and the distinction between peacetime law and the laws of wars has become vague.
As a result, coping with al Qaeda forces us to overcome the dualism of the latter two categories and

126 Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
127 Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 540.
128 Decoupled from the criterion “statehood.”
129 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, 136 (stating that the Geneva Convention will apply to “declared war(s)” between countries).
130 See supra Part III.B.1.
131 Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 29, at 755-56.
132 Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 455.
133 Robert Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 769, 794 (2011).
134 Kaldor, supra note 3, at 123.
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accept that there are now multiple layers in between.135 Even within this war, it does make a difference, from a due process standpoint, if you arrest somebody on the hot battlefield in Afghanistan
(Hamdi), in Bosnia (Boumediene) or in Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport (Padilla).136 Yet, as a
general rule, the laws of (transnational) wars have to reduce its distance to (domestic) peacetime
law,137 insofar as their subjects (at least in Padilla/Boumediene constellations) resemble more and more
subjects of peacetime law.138 In concrete terms, this means that—in the detention context—the
procedures prescribed internationally for detention during the war on terror should move closer to
a basic standard of due process granted in cases of criminal detentions, particularly for captures far
away from the hot battlefield.
Most importantly, this necessitates a heightened standard of detention review, for three primary reasons. First, the current provisions authorize detention of combatants “till cessation of
conflict”.139 Given the nature of the war on terror, this leads de facto to indefinite detentions—who
can predict when, if ever, this war will definitely be over?140 Second, in the absence of a welldefined battlefield or visible combatant features such as uniforms or openly carried weapons, it is
increasingly difficult to identify the enemy for certain141 which carries a heightened risk of erroneous detention—unless, of course, the detainee is caught in the act of fighting. And third, assuming
such an erroneous capture took place, the limited procedural options the detainee has at this point
of time deprive him of his right to effectively challenge his detention: he does not get to see classified evidence,142 hearsay is accepted, the some evidence standard is applied, and he has no access to legal
counsel.143 In these three aspects, the new global and denationalized wars are remarkably different
from nation state wars. Ignoring these differences by persistently applying nation states’ “one size
fits all” tools leads to results outside of the law—especially in Padilla or Boumediene situations far away
135 See The Place of Human Rights in the War on TerrorWar 21st (examining whether to apply criminal law during wars);
Wippman, supra note 57, at 1-2. But see Wippman, supra note 29, at 6, 53-54.
136 See also “three part test” established by Justice Kennedy in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, ___ (citing Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
137 See Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 Stan.
L. Rev. 1079, 1096 (2008). The Court appropriately calls this a “convergence pressure.” Id. at 1131.
138 In the absence of openly carried weapons and military uniforms, it is often difficult to distinguish terrorists from
civilians and thus to identify the former as belligerents. Especially, when apprehensions take place far away from the
battlefield, it can be challenging to prove a belligerency affiliation. Consequently, those persons are rather tried under
criminal law. See Associated Press, Jose Padilla sentenced on terrorism charges (Jan. 1, 2008), available at http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/22784470/#.T1qaKnlnDLs, and for the case of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who was arrested in
Illinois, see John Schwartz, Admitted Qaeda Agent Receives Prison Sentence, N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/us/30marri.html?_r=1.
139 See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316
(1955).
140 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 2277 (2008).
141 Many captures are taking place in a civilian rather than in a combat setting, see Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith,
supra note 137, at 1100.
142 And in the wars of the 21st century where the importance of intelligence increases and consequently more and more
information is classified, it is more likely that the actual grounds for detention cannot be revealed.
143 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527-28 (2004).
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from the hot battlefield. Yet, as pointed out above, this is unacceptable in a state of consent. Interestingly, the Supreme Court seems to arrive at the very same conclusion when it held in Hamdi, and
Hamdi was indeed caught on the hot battlefield(!), that the procedures then in place did not provide a ”“meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis of his detention”..”144 Four years later,
the Supreme Court reiterated its discontent with the standard of detention review in its Boumediene
decision:145
“At the CSRT stage the detainee has limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the
Government’s case, does not have the assistance of counsel, and may not be aware of the most critical allegations that the Government relied upon to order his detention. His opportunity to confront
witnesses is likely to be more theoretical than real, given that there are no limits on the admission of
hearsay. The Court therefore agrees with petitioners that there is considerable risk of error in the
tribunal’s findings of fact. And given that the consequence of error may be detention for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk is too significant to ignore.“.”
Even though the Hamdi and Boumediene rulings facially measure the al Qaeda detentions solely
under US domestic law, they both can be described as decisions “rendered in the shadow of international law.”146 Since the Supreme Court’s motives for establishing the three part test in Boumediene147 was mainly countering the newly heightened risk of erroneous and indefinite detention, those
guidelines are useful in our context, too (primarily the criteria locus of apprehension and practical
obstacles to habeas review).
With this in mind, amendments to the Geneva Conventions not only need to create a category
for transnational conflicts that provides for procedures reflecting the factual differences between
transnational and nation states’ fighters, but also need take into account the different apprehension
constellations global terrorism confronts us with. That means the transnational conflict category
must provide for a range of due process levels. At a minimum, the guarantees under Common
Article 3 must apply to all al Qaeda members caught on the hot battlefield (Hamdi). For apprehensions made on the outer boundaries of the “lukewarm” battlefield (Boumediene), there should be a
category affording an intermediate level of due process. Finally, persons captured far away from the
active theatre of war (Padilla/Al-Marri) should be entitled to procedural guarantees similar to those
afforded in criminal proceedings.
But who gets to decide which apprehension constitutes a hot, lukewarm, or offsite capture?
Who gets to review the evidence supporting the authorization of detention? Since there is no dispute over the fact that there are state secrets that cannot be disclosed, special domestic courts should
be set up (similar to the FISA Court) to hear those habeas cases in an effort to compensate for evidence that needs to remain classified but also to be reviewed by a neutral decision-maker. It should
be this court to ultimately decide which of the three proposed levels of procedural safeguards is
144 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
145 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2269.
146 Due to the fact that the Supreme Court borrowed concepts in this decisions from international humanitarian and
incorporated those into its own interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and statutes. See David D. Caron, International
Decisions, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 782, 786-287 (2004).
147 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 2236-38 (2008).
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actually due.
VI. Conclusion
Granting procedural baseline guarantees even to our worst enemies is, inter alia, what distinguishes states of consent from those of terror, and is what constitutes the basis of our constitutional
order. Applying the definition of terror introduced earlier, deviating from these state of consent
standards ultimately amounts to a fundamental breach of our system-defining obligations and thus
fulfills the second (the negative) criterion of the definition. Abandoning our fundamental values and
rule-of-law achievements is not only delegitimizing our government, but equivalent to surrendering
to the state of terror. This is why the U.S. should not unilaterally sacrifice rights and values fundamental to our constitutional order on the altar of national security,148 as it did with NDAA’s Sec.
1021, but initiate negotiations that ought to lead to the amendment of the Geneva Conventions. As
President Roosevelt put it: “Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere.”149
By demanding a de facto due process extension, the Supreme Court seems to have understood
the need for convergence between peace- and wartime detention. But in the absence of modern,
adequately adapted legal tools at hand, it overstepped its powers applying provisions that are in fact
not applicable. This struggle perfectly demonstrates the urgent necessity of new legal mechanisms,
of “new weapons” for the “new wars.” This is why the U.S. government should introduce proposals
for a reform of the Geneva Conventions in the aforementioned manner. In 1977, the Geneva Conventions were successfully amended to cope with new realities. Why should that not work again?
As Wippman has put it: in the past century, the laws of wars have been substantially revised every 25
to 30 years by major new treaties; by that standard, we are now due for another revision.150
Despite that the reality that national security is a key factor for the states of consent, and detention of al Qaeda captives remains critical, so too is the state’s duty to ensure and respect individual
rights and liberties (even those of our enemies), and to adhere both to the rule of law and to our
moral principles. Of course, von Humboldt is right in saying that without security there is no liberty. But, particularly in a state of consent that defines itself by the protection of human rights and
the adherence to the rule of law, it is also true that without fundamental freedoms—protected by
mechanisms guaranteeing due process—security is only of very limited use.

148 In Re Directives (FISA Court of Review), 551 F.3d 1004, 1116 (2008).
149 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms Address to Congress 77 Cong. Record 87, Pt. I. (1941), available at
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/pdfs/fftext.pdf.
150 Wippman, supra note 29, at 1-3.

